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The United Nations and Collective Security: Challenges and Lessons, 1945-2005

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Abstract

Human history is replete with war within and between nations. As contact and relations increased among states across the globe, so did the violent conflict and the attendant chaos and misery. Most notable among these global conflicts, were the First and Second Worlds which led to the deaths of tens of millions. The devastation of these conflicts prompted attempts at peace through conflict prevention. One of these approaches to conflict prevention was collective security. In line with this approach, the United Nations was established in 1945 in the pursuit of global peace and order. The journey of the United Nations as a collective security arrangement requires further study. This paper adopts the historical descriptive method and utilises the Realist Theory for theoretical clarification. The findings highlighted that the Cold War and great powers' rivalry encumbered the United Nations initial attempts at the preservation of global peace. It was not all gloom however, as some measure of success was recorded in places in like Korea (1953), Congo (1960) and Kuwait (1991) among others. Part of this positive is the successful use of peacekeeping as stabilization force across the world. The paper concludes that despite the challenges, the United Nations and collective security are a beacon of hope in a somewhat disorderly international system. An expanded security council, a clearly defined concept of aggressor nation, as well as a clear procedure on conception and termination of collective security actions will better equip the UN for the challenges ahead.

Keywords: conflict, threats, power, security, violence.
Wordcount: 246

Introduction

Collective security was introduced as a major statecraft in international relations at the end of the First World War. This war had brought great devastation on the world such that there were fears the world might not survive another conflict of such magnitude. The scale of destruction was so huge it was known as the Great War. The immediate aftermath of WWI experienced a rise in Political Idealism as espoused by Immanuel Kant and other Idealist/ Liberalist theorists including President Woodrow Wilson of the United States of America (Wilson, 1919).[1] They argued that war occurs because one nation attacks another. If all states

[1] Wilson W. (1919), International Politics, *President Wilson House*.

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agreed not to commit aggression and others support the victims of an attack, no state would be in a position of invading another and face the combined opposition of all others. War it was then expected would soon fall into oblivion. Given the lack of a world government to ensure peace, an international institution backed by the collectivity of states would take up the responsibility (Wilson, 1919).[2]

Despite its moral origins and noble ideas, the concept failed to fulfill its initial promises. It was unable to stop the combined expansionism of Germany, Italy and Japan before the Second World War. After 1945, the concept was yet again unable to prevent or stop the Cold War between the superpowers. Neither the League nor the United Nations were able to operate the principle successfully to prevent aggression. This was because of the conflict of interest among states especially among the major powers. The existence of such conflicts has in fact been recognized in the institutionalized arrangements of the two world bodies themselves. Under the Covenant of the League of Nations the response to aggression was left to the member states to decide -article 16, paragraph 3, as amended by interpretive resolutions adopted in 1921 (LON, 1920).[3] And under the UN Charter any permanent member of the Security Council may veto collective action-article 27, paragraph 3 (UN, 1945).[4]

Yet, the idea has displayed an extraordinary appeal and resilience. President Woodrow Wilson took the concept from proposals originating in liberal circles during the war and turned it into American policy. The concept was embodied in the League of Nations which emerged from the Versailles Peace. Despite the collapse of the League in the 1930's, collective security was chosen also after the Second World War, with the founding of the United Nations. This attempt soon got tested by the emergence of the Cold War in 1947. Nevertheless, after the end of the Cold War, the concept has reemerged as one of the main foci for the construction of a new international system.

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https://woodrowwilsonhouse.org/wilson-topics/international-policy/
[2] Wilson W. (1919), International Politics

[3] **League of Nations Official Journal (1920, February),** ***The Covenant of the League of Nations LON 1920.***
https://www.ungeneva.org/en/about/league-of-nations/covenant
[4] The United Nations (1945), *United Nations Charter (Full Text).*
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text

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Collective security goes beyond the idea of defence to include arrangements for facilitating peaceful settlements. This is based on the assumption that the mechanisms for preventing war and defending states under attack will supplement and reinforce each other. Collective security was the name given by the international community to the system for maintenance of international peace intended as replacement for the system commonly known as the balance of power (BOP). The arrangement was intended to transcend the reliance on deterrence of competing alliances through a network of national commitments and international mechanisms. As in collective defence, collective security is based on the risk of retribution, but can also involve economic and diplomatic responses. Theoretically it can be argued that a perfect and adequate collective security arrangement would discourage potential aggressors from provoking response from a collection of committed states. This is similar to the Balance of Power-BOP Mechanism which is based on the belief that no nation should be allowed to be strong enough to destabilize the international system. A BOP equilibrium is expected to create stability and ensure peace. Therein, collective security works on the assumption that potential aggressors would be deterred by the prospects of joint retaliation. Any act of aggression wouldn't just be met with force but overwhelming and decisive force. However, collective security goes beyond the military realm to include wider arrays of security and diplomatic mechanisms. It assumes that states will relinquish sovereignty and freedom of action to increasing interdependence and the noble premise of indivisibility of peace. This is the bedrock and foundation of neoliberal institutionalism argument.

Collective Security

The concept of collective security is an idealist notion which hinges on the prevention of hostilities by the formation of an overwhelming military force by member states to deter aggression. And by implication, to launch a reprisal attack capable of defeating the unruly member. Collective security connotes the institutionalization of a global police force against abuse of order and breaches, which can lead to insecurity. According to George Schwarzeberger, collective security is a "machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order" (Schwarzeberger, 1951).[5] It is an arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the

[5] Schwarzenberger G. (1951), *Power Politics, A Study Of International Society,* F.A. Praeger, New York 1951

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actions of all against any state within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force (Cronin, 2017).[6]

Framework and Features of Collective Security

This concept of individual security by collective means through the membership of an international organization made up of all or most of the states of the world pledged to defend each other from attack, was extensively discussed during the World War I. It took shape in the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, and again in the Charter of the United Nations after World War II (Palmer & Perkins (2007).[7] For collective security to be effective the collective system arrangement must be strong enough to cope with aggression from any power or combination of powers (Palmer & Perkins, 2007).[8] The principle of collective security involves a willingness to apply sanctions as and when necessary and even to go to war. Collective security will never work unless all the nations that take part in it are prepared simultaneously to threaten with sanctions and to fight, if necessary, an aggressor. It must be open to those states which are willing to accept its obligations in good faith.

Collective security is based on four principles:

- All countries abstain from the use of force except in self-defence
- All countries agree that peace is indivisible as such an attack on one is an attack on all
- All countries pledge to unite to halt aggression and restore the peace
- All countries agree to supply whatever material or personnel resources that are necessary to form a collective security force required defeating aggressors and restore the peace (Palmer & Perkins, 2007) [9]

Features of Collective Security

- Collective security mechanisms could be embedded within inter-state organizations, such as the League of Arab States (Osmańczyk, 2003).[10] It could also be formed pursuant to

[6] Cronin, B. (2017), Security Regimes: Collective Security and Security Communities in *The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, Oxford University Press.
[7] Palmer & Perkins (2007), *International Relations*, CBS Publishers 3rd Edition.
[8] Palmer and Perkins , *International Relations*
[9] Palmer & Perkins (2007), *International Relations*

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inter-state agreements and operate independently of any particular institutional setting, such as the collective security provisions in the treaties of the Peace of Westphalia (Schmidt, 2011).[11] Moreover, collective security mechanisms could be bilateral or multilateral. Irrespective of the form or variation however, all collective security mechanisms share a set of common features.

1. Collective security is based on the ancient adage: "*unus pro omnibus*", "*omnes pro uno*" one for all, and all for one (a confraternity of sorts). This means that "a war against one state is, *ipso facto*, considered a war against all (Ruggie, 1998)."[12] This commitment to consider an attack against one as an attack against all is often codified in a legal instrument. To count as a genuine collective security mechanism that commitment of a united response against aggression must be ironclad, it "permits no ifs or buts (Claude, 1971)."[13] Collective security, therefore, operates like domestic law enforcement.

2. Collective security is non-discriminatory. Its members commit to aid each other against any and all aggressors (Shimko, 2014).[14] The guarantee of protection is unequivocal and is not limited to a specific enemy. It is a general, non-discriminatory guarantee of protection against all attacks regardless of their source, origin, or nature. Just as all members strong or weak, are afforded an identical guarantee of protection (Thomas Weiss Et Al, 2001).[15]

3. Collective security is established on the belief of the indivisibility of security among its Member States. This means that the participating states believe that their individual security is jeopardized whenever an ally is threatened or attacked. That is even if that threat or attack does not directly implicate or affect every member state of a collective

[10] Osmańczyk, E. J. (2003), League of Arab States Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation, 1950 In Mango, Anthony (Ed.). *Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements. Vol. 2* (3rd Edition) Routledge.
[11] Schmidt S. (2011), To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of Westphalia in International Relations Literature, *International Studies Quarterly* 55.
[12] Ruggie J. G.(1998), *Constructing The World Polity*, Routledge.
[13] Claude I. (1971), *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, Random House
[14] Shimko K. (2014), *International Relations: Perspectives, Controversies and Readings,* Wadsworth Pub Co.
[15] Thomas Weiss Et Al (2001), *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, Westview Press.

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security arrangement (Hurrell, 1992).[16] This process requires a significant reconfiguration of a state's understanding of its national interest since traditionally, states will only use force to defend their national territory or their vital national interests. However, by joining a collective security arrangement, states expand their definition of their national security and vital interests to include the survival and security of their allies (Helal, 2018).[17]As Hans Morgenthau explains, collective security requires forsaking "national egotisms and the national policies serving them. Collective security expects policies of the individual nations to be inspired by the idea of mutual assistance and the spirit of self-sacrifice (Morgenthau, 1948)"[18]

Realist Theoretical Arguments against Collective Security

According to realist thinker John J. Mearsheimer the theory of collective security deals directly with the issue of peace, war and military power (Mearsheimer, 1994). How peace can be ensured especially with the realization that military power is central to activities in international politics (Mearsheimer, 1994).[19] Mearsheimer is primarily concerned with the uncertainty about intentions of states, relative gains as well as power and the limits of institutions. He argues that the key to enhancing stability in a world inhabited by armed states is the proper management of military power. For some advocates of collective security, institutions are the key to managing power successfully.

Although collective security emphasizes the continuing importance of military force, it is explicitly anti-realist. Proponents of collective security express distaste for balance-of-power logic and traditional alliances espoused by realism. In addition, they desire to create a world where those realist concepts have no role to play.

However, even scholars such as Inis Claude who argue in favour of collective security simultaneously expressed reservations about its actual practice (Claude, 1971).[20] Collective security starts with the assumption that states behave according to the dictates of realism,

[16] Hurrell, A.M. (1992). Collective Security and International Order Revisited. *International Relations.*
[17] Helal M. S. (2018), The Myth of United Nations (UN) Collective Security, *Emory International Law Review* Vol. 32.
[18] Morgenthau H. J. (1948), *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* A. Knopf.
[19] Mearsheimer J. J. (1994), The False Promise of International Institutions, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 MIT Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078
[20] Claude I. (1971), *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress Of International organization*, Random House

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however, moves beyond the self-help world of realism to institutional solutions. Specifically, the goal is to convince states to base their behavior on three profoundly anti-realist norms (Mearsheimer, 1994).[21] Firstly, states must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo. Secondly, states must not think in terms of narrow self-interest when they act against aggressors, but must instead choose to equate their national interest with the broader interests of the international community. Thirdly, states must trust and not fear each other (Mearsheimer, 1994).[22]

Meanwhile, the presence of multiple aggressor nations realist theorists argue raises the question of whether most states in the system are actually committed to peace. As such whether it makes rational sense to trust collective security. Further compounding the problem is the inability to judge or predict intentions of states until intentions are put into practice. All these makes it more difficult for states to trust the collective security mechanism.

Moreover, the complex network of requirements which are perquisite to a functional and effective collective security system alongside other impediments makes it even harder to justify as an effective tool for global peace management. Some of these impediments include; the ability to clearly distinguish between aggressor and victim; the basic assumption that aggression is always wrong; the obvious reluctance of historically or ideological friendly nations to join a coalition against each other; the complication of collective security efforts by the presence of historical animosity and enmity; the difficulty of distributing burden among coalition members; the slow response of coalition members to acts of aggression especially in cases of multiple infractions; the possibility of transforming a local conflict into a global conflagration; the clash between responses to coalition demands and state sovereignty and; the inherent contradiction in a system that advocates the use of force to solve the problem of force (Mearsheimer, 1994).[23] In sum, states have abundant reasons to doubt that collective security will work as advertised when the chips are down and aggression seems likely. Should it fail, potential victims are likely to be in deep trouble if they have ignored balance-of-power considerations and placed their faith in collective security. Recognizing this, states

[21] Mearsheimer J. J. (1994), The False Promise of International Institutions
[22] Mearsheimer J. J. (1994), The False Promise of International Institutions
[23] Mearsheimer J. J. (1994), The False Promise of International Institutions

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are not likely to place their fate in the hands of other states, but will prefer instead the realist logic of self-help.

Furthermore realist theorists argue that historical record provides little support for collective security as states have repeatedly resorted to self-help after the collapse of collective security arrangements (Mearsheimer, 1994).[24] The first attempt at collective security the League of Nations (LON) had a very woeful record. The League was seriously tested on six occasions: 1) the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931; 2) the Chaco War of 1932-35; 3) Japan's 1937 invasion of China; 4) Italy's aggression against Ethiopia in 1935; 5) the German occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936; and 6) the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939. The League failed each test, and was effectively useless by the late 1930s. this prompted further critical decisions by the great powers which eventually led to World War II (UN, 1945).[25]

The second attempt at collective security and the successor to the League of Nation (LON) the United Nations was established in the waning days of World War II to provide collective security around the globe. However, the Soviet-American competition followed on the heels of that war. All these strengthened realist arguments that institutions had very little independent effect on state behavior. As such policymakers must not rely on institutionalism which do not accurately describe the world. Policies based institutionalist assumptions are bound to fail. The argument goes further that the international system strongly shapes the behavior of states, limiting the amount of damage that false faith in institutional theories can cause however, misplaced reliance on institutional solutions is likely to lead to more failures for the states involved (Mearsheimer, 1994).[26]

The League of Nations (LON) and the First Attempt at Collective Security

America President Woodrow Wilson strongly believed that the system of alliances and secret diplomacy were responsible for the cataclysm of 1914-1918 (Wilson 1919).[27] He desired a break from the past arguing that preservation of peace had to be based on new practices. As

[24] Mearsheimer J. J. (1994), The False Promise of International Institutions
[25] United Nations, *The League at Work,* United Nations Office Geneva. https://www.ungeneva.org/en/about/league-of-nations/at-work
[26] Mearsheimer J. J. (1994), The False Promise of International Institution
[27] Wilson W. (1918), International Politics,

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such he placed the creation of the League of Nations at the top of the agenda during the 1919 Peace Conference (Wilson 1919).[28] The Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted on 28 April 1919, provided that "the members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League" (Art. 10) and that, should any member "resort to war, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League" - Art. 16 (LON, 1920).[29]

However, the means at the disposal of the League to enforce this commitment were rather limited. In the case of unanimity, Article 16 obliged the League's member states to take part in economic and financial sanctions against the state recognised as the aggressor. However, their participation in military action, which required the unanimous agreement of the Council, remained optional (OTH, 1919).[30] The French plan for a strong League of Nations with a permanent international military staff failed to materialize. In its place was the Anglo-American plans, which emphasized public proceedings and the moral pressure of public opinion to prevent conflict.

Moreover, the refusal of the United States to join further weakened the LON, just as the failure to ratify the "Protocol for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes" rendered it almost powerless. Its ability to settle international disputes was thus limited to conflicts that did not call into question the interests of the Great Powers. It was only a matter of time before the power, commitment and resolve of the LON was tested and this came in the 1930s. The collective security system experienced resounding failures in the 1930s. The League repeatedly showed itself incapable of guaranteeing the protections of Article 10 to those members threatened by the aggressive policies of dictatorial regimes. It proved unable in 1931-1932, for instance, to prevent the conquest of Manchuria by Japan. Japan was a permanent member of the Council of the League which withdrew in 1933 when condemned

[28] Wilson W. (1918), International Politics, *President Wilson House*.

[29] **League of Nations Official Journal (1920, February), *The Covenant of the League of Nations LON 1920.*** https://www.ungeneva.org/en/about/league-of-nations/covenant

[30] Office of the Historian, *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XIII*, Department of State United States of America https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv13/ch10subch1

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by the Geneva-based institution. In 1935 the League was brought into further disrepute by the aggression of Italy against Ethiopia another member of the League since 1923. Italy ultimately decided to annex Ethiopia in May 1936.

The United Nations and Collective Security

The United Nations (UN) in the aftermath of WWII provided another opportunity for the ideas and principles of collective security to be put into practice. The idea behind the collective security system is that members of the organization advancing the collective security system (this time, the United Nations) are bound to spring to each other's defense in case of attack. The principle of collective security was adopted by the United Nations, established by the San Francisco Charter on 26 June 1945. Aware of the weaknesses of the League of Nations, however, its founders attempted to improve the mechanisms of collective security by giving a decisive role to the principal victors of the Second World War.These nations became permanent members of the Security Council (USA, USSR, China, UK, France) and were assigned the role of "policemen" within the new international system. The Security Council, on which the Big Five have the power of veto, was given "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" -Art. 24 (UN, 1945).[31] In the case of a threat to peace or act of aggression, the Security Council can decide on economic sanctions (Art. 41) or to "take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" -Art. 42 (UN, 1945).[32] It was intended that all member states would commit to making a certain number of armed forces available to the Security Council. This was to be done under special agreements that would specify their size, composition, degree of readiness and location. However, these agreements were never established. The use of these forces was meant to be planned by an international military staff, but this was never put into practice either.

UN Collective Security in Practice

[31] Charter of the United Nations https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/
[32] Charter of the United Nations https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/

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Since 1945, the Collective Security system has been operationalised in a number of cases, Korea in 1950, Congo in 1960, and Iraq/ Kuwait in 1991.

Korean War

North Korea invaded South Korea on the night of 24-25th June 1950 (Weathersby, 2005).[33] The Security Council, in the absence of the USSR, decided on June 25 and 27, 1950 to take enforcement action against the aggressor, North Korea. It held that North Korean attack on South Korea constituted a breach of peace and called for an immediate withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea (Weathersby, 2005).[34] The response of the members to the Security Council resolutions was quite favourable as 53 countries expressed their willingness to support the Collective Security action against aggressive North Korea (Weathersby, 2005).[35] The American intervention (bringing together 17 countries legitimized by the Security Council in the temporary absence of the Soviets (Andreatta, 1996).[36] Western troops fighting against the Communist aggression were formally placed under the UN banner.

However, the U.N. Collective Security operations in Korea became highly complicated when Communist China intervened in the Korean War protecting the interests of North Korea. The Chinese intervention led to hesitation towards continued collective security operations in Korea as many countries feared further escalation of the conflict. The Korean operation was not a classic case of collective security as both Cold War Blocs supported and intervened in the conflict in the pursuit of their respective ideologies. Nevertheless, it was the only instance during the Cold War in which the provisions of Chapter VII were applied (Andreatta, 1996).[37] Many neutral and nonaligned nations such as Ethiopia and India supported the UN action in defence of South Korea.(Andreatta, 1996).[38]

Congo Crisis of the 1960s and subsequent years

[33] Weathersby K. (2005), Stalin And The Korean War in *Origins Of The Cold War An International History*, (Eds) Leffler M. P. & Painter D. S., Second Edition Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
[34] Weathersby (2005), Stalin And The Korean War
[35] Weathersby (2005), Stalin And The Korean War
[36] Andreatta F. (1996), Collective Security Theory and Practice of an Institution for Peace in the XX Century, *London School of Economics and Political Science Summer*.
[37] Andreatta F. (1996), Collective Security Theory and Practice
[38] Andreatta F. (1996), Collective Security Theory and Practice

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Collective security in Congo was quite successful as the United Nations (UN) Congo Operation (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964 was able to save the country from being completely torn apart by strife (Andreatta, 1996).[39] The cold war between the two super powers, the bipolarity in international relations, the inability of the General Assembly to act under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, and the changed nature of aggression and war, all combined to prevent the effective operationalization of collective security mechanism for most parts of the 1960s right through to 1990 (Andreatta, 1996).[40] The Vietnam War, the Lebanon Crisis, the Iran-Iraq War, The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and several other conflicts festered with the UN handicapped and unable to successful prevent or intervene.

Iraq and Kuwait in 1990

However, during this last decade of the 20th century, the collective security system acted as a popular and useful device for the preservation of international peace and security. It was successfully operationalized in the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Following procedure after the violations of international peace and security resulting from the Iraqi act of aggression, the UN Security Council condemned the invasion and called upon Iraq to unconditionally withdraw from Kuwaiti territory. Failure to comply led to the imposition of economic and other sanctions against Iraq. Failure of the Iraqi authorities to comply with UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of their occupying forces, prompted UN Security Council to take decisive military action, i.e. collective security action against Iraq. A UN peace keeping force was raised under the US leadership and to which 42 countries contributed their armed contingents (O'Connell, 1991).[41] On 17th January 1991, Collective Security war against Iraq was initiated and within few weeks, Iraq's resistance was neutralized and liberation of Kuwait was secured (O'Connell, 1991).[42] Collective Security war was successfully deployed to negate Iraqi aggression and secure international peace and order.

This exercise was successful primarily due to the keen interest taken by the USA and the inability or unwillingness on the part of the other four permanent members of Security

[39] Andreatta F. (1996), Collective Security Theory and Practice
[40] Andreatta F. (1996), Collective Security Theory and Practice
[41] O'Connell M. E. (1991), Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N.'s Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, *Articles by Maurer Faculty*. 2085. https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2085
[42] O'Connell M. E. (1991), Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force

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Council to oppose the United States (O'Connell, 1991).[43] The internal troubles of the (erstwhile) the USSR compelled it to support the US sponsored decisions and policies. Further the decision to continue sanctions against, Iraq even after the end of its aggression against Kuwait reflected the problems involved in keeping a collective security war limited and confined.

Post 9/11 United Nations Collection Security and Interventions

New developments in the international system gave a new strength of the operationalization of collective security. In one form or another between 2001 and 2005, the UN collective security operations for preserving peace and security operated over twenty (20) different missions across the globe. In 2001 war against Afghanistan's Al Qaeda's terrorist regime was made under the UN Charter (Hurd, 2014).[44] However, this harmony was short-lived as the US under President George Bush decided on implementing the new US foreign policy of preemptive strikes and regimes change in perceived hostile nations through unilateral interventions (Hurd, 2014).[45] This commenced with the war against Iraq in the name of eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and subsequent actions in Africa and the Middle East. Such US actions eroded and undermined the role and relevance of UN.

Collective Security Concerns and Challenges

The concept of Collective Security is based upon certain idealistic assumptions which make its operationalization difficult. Such as the assumption that there can be a complete international understanding regarding the nature of all threats or aggressions against international peace and security. And the assumption that all nations could and would come forward to take up collective security actions against an aggressor (Mearsheimer, 1994).[46] Moreover, there are times when both the nature of aggression and the perceived aggressor are not easily identified. Often times an aggressor could justify his acts in the name of self-defence (Mearsheimer, 1994).[47]

[43] O'Connell M. W. (1991), Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force
[44] Hurd I. (2014), The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law, *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1
[45] Hurd I. (2014), The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law
[46] Mearsheimer J. J. (1994), The False Promise of International Institutions
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In addition, collective security justifies armed conflict. This act makes collective security somewhat self-negating in so far as it first denounces war or aggression as an illegal activity, then recommends collective armed warfare as the most effective way of rectifying the situation. Furthermore, it rules out the possibility among states of 'neutrality' in times of war: The concept of collective security makes it an international obligation of all the nations to pool their resources and undertake collective action in the event of an aggression. This effectively takes away the option of choices for those involved (Mearsheimer, 1994).[48] Also, the concept of collective security as laid down in the U.N. Charter, has two inherent limitations. Firstly, it accepts the right of the states to undertake war as a measure of self-defence against any aggression. In practice this provision gives a legal basis to an aggression or war in the name of action in self-defence. Secondly, it recognizes the right of the nations to establish regional defence pacts and organisations for protecting their security. It admits regional security systems as devices for preserving peace and security. The working of regional security systems has in-fact been a source of strain upon international peace and security.

Nevertheless, the absence of a permanent international peace keeping force has been a major challenge. It is only after a decision of the Security Council that military action could be initiated against an aggressor. This process especially raising troops for authorized missions is often very slow. The time-gap between the date of aggression and the date of United Nations troops deployment is extensive which gives the aggressor all the time needed to reap the benefits of aggression. Closely related to this is the significant dependence on powerful states. Powerful states always dominate collective security decisions and in fact, only the powerful states can play an effective role in executing a collective security action. Britain's failure in its role as balancer to respond appropriately to the Japanese invasion of China in the late 1930's was very decisive. Britain felt that it would overstretch its resources if it opposed the aggression while it desperately needed all of its forces in Europe (Mearsheimer, 1994).[49] In addition, interventions always carry with them fear of potential escalation of violence. Realist critics such as Hans Morgenthau have argued that collective security system and its interventionist approach could transform a local war into a global war involving all the

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nations (Morgenthau, 1962).[50] Somewhat ironically, the security regime created by the U.N. Charter, the centerpiece of which is the Security Council, shares none of these features of a proper collective security mechanism. Rather, the Security Council was designed and continues to operate as a Great Power Concert (Helal, 2018).[51]

Conclusion

Despite these points of criticism and recognized weaknesses of the Collective Security system, it cannot be denied that the system has not been totally meaningless and without positive features. It has brought into vision the idea and possibility of collective steps for the preservation of world peace through crisis management in the event of a war. The chances for a more purposeful and successful use of Collective Security in this post-cold war world have brightened. Currently it is being operationalized in several different parts of the world. Moreover, the peacekeeping aspect of collective security has been quite a powerful force for international stability. In conclusion however, the system requires adjustments and more reforms for better efficiency and improved performance.

Recommendations

Collective Security system can successfully operate when the following conditions are present in the international system:

1. An agreement on the definition of aggression and the existence of a permeant international peace keeping force
2. A more powerful role for the United Nations Security Council and strong commitment from its permanent members in favour of collective security
3. An expanded security council with more permeant members representing the presently excluded regions in the developing world
4. An established procedure for the termination of every collective security action
5. Popularization of peaceful means of conflict resolution, as well as strengthening of peaceful means of crisis-management

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6. Commitment to the establishment of sustainable global socio-economic development across the globe

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